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THE FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER
MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON - A "REASONABLE"
PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION
With the recent decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson,1 the Su-
preme Court rendered constitutional the "plain feel" doctrine, yet
another exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution. Most liberally applied, the plain feel doctrine
allows police officers, while in the process of a lawful pat search of a
suspect, to seize any contraband that they detect based on their
sense of touch.8 Until its constitutional endorsement, the state and
federal courts were split over the propriety of such an extension
under the Fourth Amendment.4 While the Dickerson decision en-
dorsed the constitutionality of this exception, it simultaneously lim-
ited the exception's application by mandating that any such search
remain within strictly delineated boundaries.'
This Note begins by providing a brief historical survey of recent
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to enable the reader to clearly
understand the constitutional underpinnings that allowed the plain
feel doctrine to evolve.6 This survey initially presents the general
foundations of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, and then moves into a more detailed discussion of the "stop
and frisk" and plain view doctrines.7 Next, this Note discusses how
the convergence of those doctrines led to the gradual acceptance of
the plain feel doctrine,8 addressing several cases decided prior to
1. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
2. Id. at 2137.
3. Id.
4. See infra note 242 (listing jurisdictions and cases which have considered the plain feel test).
5. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137-39.
6. See infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text (discussing several seminal Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment decisions).
7. See infra notes 35-133 and accompanying text (discussing the background of the "stop and
frisk" and plain view doctrines).
8. See infra notes 134-55 and accompanying text (discussing the confluence of the "stop and
frisk" and plain view doctrines).
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Dickerson.9 Examining the Dickerson case, this Note focuses on
both the lower court opinions and the Supreme Court opinion,'0 as
well as two lower court cases decided subsequent to Dickerson."
Next, this note analyzes the plain feel doctrine and evaluates its
propriety and applicability both practically and jurisprudentially, 2
carefully presenting the methodologies used in Dickerson and its im-
pact on lower court cases decided subsequently." Finally, this Note
proposes a unique methodology for the lower courts to follow in ap-
plying the plain feel doctrine. 4
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.""
The amendment utilizes the words "search" and "seizure" as limit-
ing principles, requiring police officers to be reasonable only if they
are conducting either "searches" or "seizures." 16 What constitutes a
search is an elusive question, and one the Supreme Court attempted
to answer in a variety of ways over the past century. 7 This section
provides a historical overview of the Court's Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence that will be useful in analyzing the development of the
plain feel exception.
A. Prior to Recognition of Fourth Amendment Privacy
Prior to the seminal case of Katz v. United States 8 in 1967, the
Supreme Court interpreted the word "searches," as it is used in the
Fourth Amendment, rather narrowly.1 9 The Court would only find
9. See infra notes 156-234 and accompanying text (discussing cases that considered the plain
feel test prior to Dickerson).
10. See infra notes 235-70 and accompanying text (discussing Dickerson).
11. See infra notes 271-304 and accompanying text (examining lower courts application of the
plain feel doctrine in the wake of Dickerson).
12. See infra notes 305-79 and accompanying text (analyzing the plain feel doctrine).
13. See infra notes 380-407 and accompanying text (examining the impact of Dickerson).
14. See infra notes 408-22 and accompanying text (proposing a "reasonable" methodology for
the analysis of "plain feel" cases).
15. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
16. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
356 (1974).
17. See infra notes 27-232 and accompanying text (providing a brief, limited history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence relevant to the plain feel exception).
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court unequivocally held that the
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that a search had actually occurred if the police had physically in-
truded into a "constitutionally protected area."2 Protected areas
were those specified by the Constitution itself: "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects."21 This was the state of the law until the landmark
decision in Katz v. United States22 marked "a watershed in
[F]ourth [A]mendment jurisprudence. ' 23 It was with Katz that the
Court attempted to move "toward a redefinition of the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. 24
B. Katz v. United States and the Foundations of Fourth
Amendment Privacy
In Katz, the trial court convicted the defendant for violating a
federal statute which prohibited the transmission of wagering infor-
mation by telephone over state lines .2  At trial, the court permitted
the government to introduce evidence of the defendant's portion of
telephone conversations that FBI agents overheard by attaching an
electronic listening and recording device to the phone booth from
which he made his calls.26 The Supreme Court held that this evi-
dence was inadmissible because the electronic eavesdropping in-
volved, undertaken without a search warrant, was an unconstitu-
tional search.27
wiretapping of a defendant's telephone was not a search for the reason that the telephone wires
"searched" were not part of his home. Id. at 466. Similarly, in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559
(1927), the Court held that there was no search where a Coast Guard patrolman shined a search-
light onto the deck of a motorboat and discovered cases of liquor. Id. at 563. The Court reasoned
that the use of a searchlight was comparable to the use of a field glass and therefore consistent
with the Constitution. Id.
20. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.1 at 302-03 (2d ed. 1987) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. One commentator has characterized the Court's standard as it
existed prior to 1967 as a "property-based" standard, as the Court was only concerned with
whether the particular property involved was one of those "areas" enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment. Kevin A. Lantz, Case Note, Search and Seizure: "The Princess and the 'Rock' "-
Minnesota Declines to Extend "Plain View" to "Plain Feel" - State v. Dickerson, 18 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 539, 542 (1993).
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 382.
24. Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968
SUP. CT. REV. 133, 133. Another commentator characterized the Katz opinion as "a clear effort
on the part of the Warren Court to broaden Fourth Amendment protections." JOHN F. DECKER,
REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT 35 (1992).
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 358. In so holding, the Court expressly overruled Olmstead, stating that "the under-
pinnings of Olmstead. . .have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the . . . doctrine
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In arriving at this holding, the Court reasoned that because "the
Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply 'areas' --
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it [is] clear that the
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 8 The Court went
on to stress the importance of adherence to judicial processes in the
arena of the Fourth Amendment29 and to state that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few ...well-
delineated exceptions. 30 Because electronic surveillance did not fall
into one of the "well-delineated" exceptions, the search, executed
without a warrant, was necessarily unconstitutional. 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart rejected the property-
based approach previously embraced by the Court and instead
adopted a Fourth Amendment analysis based on privacy - essen-
tially redefining when a search or seizure takes place.3 2 In his con-
currence, Justice Harlan infused some substance into this privacy
standard, stating that "there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable."33 Justice Harlan's statement emphasized
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id. at 353.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 357 (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
30. Id. For examples of exceptions, see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (upholding
warrantless police inventory search of all the contents of an arrested person's van); Schneckcloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding warrantless search where the defendant's com-
panion consented to the search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (discussing limits of
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (uphold-
ing warrantless search where police were in hot pursuit of the defendant); Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (upholding warrantless search under exigent circumstances); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (upholding warrantless search of automobile).
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358. The Court opined that authorizing such a search in the absence of a
warrant would "[bypass] the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable
cause, and [substitute] instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for
the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judg-
ment." Id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
32. Id. at 351-52. One commentator has noted that the decision in Katz did not only extend
Fourth Amendment protection to electronic surveillance, but potentially altered all future applica-
tions of the Fourth Amendment to searches and seizures. Richard L. Aynes, Katz and the Fourth
Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 63, 66 (1974).
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Although a number of subsequent Supreme Court cases, such as
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 14-15 (1973), Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
179 n.l 1 (1969) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), have cited this formulation with ap-
proval, one commentator has pointed out that such a subjective expectation of privacy has no
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the Court's newfound focus on privacy, a focus which has since been
central to the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.3
C. The Development and Boundaries of Stop and Frisk - Terry
v. Ohio, Sibron v. New York, and Peters v. New York
The Court in Katz stated that only a few "well-delineated excep-
tions" would be sufficient to escape the per se warrant require-
ment.3 5 Indeed, prior to Terry v. Ohio,36 the Court had been reluc-
tant to expand the category of acceptable exceptions.3 7 Terry,
however, not only created a "new" exception to the Warrant Clause
by sanctioning the "stop and frisk" doctrine, 8 but through its meth-
odology, lessened the standard by which courts would evaluate fu-
ture exceptions, 9 marking the first time that the Court clearly sepa-
rated the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment from the
clause proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures.40 Addition-
ally, two companion cases decided with Terry, Sibron v. New York"'
and Peters v. New York, "2 helped to define the boundaries of the
place in the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment because it neither adds to, nor would its
absence detract from, one's claim to Fourth Amendment protections. Amsterdam, supra note 16,
at 384.
Another commentator opines that the Court designed this privacy language to force law en-
forcement agencies to comply with Fourth Amendment requirements in areas where they would
previously have been unconstrained, hence broadening judicial control over police practices in all
cases which implicated a reasonable privacy expectation. Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1310-11 (1981).
34. To the ends of privacy, Justice Harlan also stated that "a man's home is ... a place where
he expects privacy," and that "reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic
as well as physical invasion." Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62. With respect to the emphasis that has
since been placed on the privacy aspects of Katz, Professor Amsterdam pointed out that "Katz
protects ... privacy interests, but ... those interests are [not] the only interests which the
fourth amendment protects." Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 385. He pointed to language in Katz
which stated that "[the Fourth Amendment's] protections go further, and often have nothing to
do with privacy at all." Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 350).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
36. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
37. Cf Ashdown, supra, note 33, at 1296-97 (stating that while before Terry the Court held
the full extent of the Fourth Amendment to be applicable subject to a few exceptions, after Terry
the Court began to look at the Fourth Amendment as a more flexible provision and began to limit
search and seizure protection in a multitude of situations).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
39. See id. at 20 (stating that warrantless searches may be permitted in certain situations if
they are reasonable).
40. Ashdown, supra note 33, at 1297 n.36 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27).
41. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
42. Id. Although the Court decided Peters and Sibron together, these cases presented quite
different factual situations and will be discussed as separate cases for the purposes of this article.
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Court's newly established "stop and frisk" exception by showing its
application in different factual situations. After a detailed examina-
tion of the seminal decision in Terry, this section discusses these
cases briefly.
In Terry, a police officer observed the defendant and another man
suspiciously walking back and forth in front of a store window in
downtown Cleveland in mid-afternoon. 3 After a third man joined in
the suspicious activities,"' the officer made the judgment, based on
his experience, that the group might be planning a robbery and
might be armed.4 5 The officer approached the trio, identified him-
self, and asked their names. 6 When he did not receive a satisfactory
response'4  he grabbed the defendant and patted down the outside of
his clothing. 8 Upon feeling a pistol in the defendant's jacket, the
officer removed the jacket and retrieved the pistol. 9 Consequently,
the trial court convicted the defendant for carrying a concealed
weapon.50
In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court began by clarify-
ing that the stop and search in this case clearly fell within the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment.5 1 The Court went on to redefine Fourth
Amendment analysis as a balancing test, eschewing the automatic
application of the Warrant Clause's requirement of probable
cause,52 and stating that "the conduct ...must be tested by the
Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ' ' 53 The Court defined this test as a balance
43. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 6-7.
47. Id. at 7. The defendant only "mumbled something" in response to the officer's inquiries. Id.
48. Id. at 6-7.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 16. Some courts had previously avoided the constitutional issue presented by such a
case by finding that a stop and frisk did not rise to the level of a search and seizure. John A.
Mackintosh, Note, 47 TEX. L. REV. 138, 140 (1968) (citing United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1960)); see also People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (N.Y. 1964) (holding that a
"frisk" is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
978 (1965). Contra People v. Taggart, 229 N.E.2d 581, 585-86 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that a
"frisk" was a "search" that was justified by less than probable cause), appeal dismissed, 392 U.S.
667 (1968).
52. With regard to the warrant requirement, the Court stated that "we deal here with an entire
rubric of police conduct - necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of
the officer on the beat - which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
53. Id. Professor LaFave suggests that this approach assumes that a lesser degree of evidence
[Vol. 44:167
FOURTH AMENDMENT
between, on one hand, "the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected inter-
ests of the private citizen, ' 54 and, on the other hand, "the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails. 55 Therefore, the critical ques-
tion was whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"
56
Applying this test, the Court first identified the "legitimate" gov-
ernmental interest of effective crime prevention, detection and inves-
tigation. 7 The Court also recognized the police officer's "more im-
mediate interest" in verifying that the person he is confronting is
not carrying a weapon that could be used against him." The Court
balanced these interests against the "severe, though brief, intrusion
upon cherished personal security" engendered by the frisk,59 and
came to the conclusion that regardless of whether the officer had
probable cause to make an arrest, "there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protec-
tion of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."60
Justice Harlan concurred in this case, as he did in Katz,61 to clar-
ify two corollaries to the holding that would "serve as initial guide-
lines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the
land."'62 First, he stated that to justify a frisk for the purposes of
will be sufficient when an officer acts without a warrant "because he is so acting and thus has
escaped the reach of the probable cause half of the amendment." Wayne R. LaFave, "Street
Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 39, 53
(1968).
54. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1966)).
55. Id. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 537).
56. Id. at 21-22. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925)).
57. Id. at 22. The Court stated that "it is [crime prevention and detection] which [underlie] the
recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest." Id.
58. Id. at 23. To substantiate this justification, the Court pointed to a recent study which indi-
cated that 55 of 57 police officers killed in 1966 died from gunshot wounds. Moreover, 41 of those
were inflicted by easily concealed handguns. Id. at 24 n.21 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 45-48, 152, table 51 (1966)).
59. Id. at 24-25.
60. Id. at 27. The Court also stated that, in determining whether an officer acted reasonably,
while weight would not be given to the officer's "hunches," his reasonable inferences based on his
experience were appropriate for consideration. Id.
61. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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protecting the police officer in an encounter with a citizen, the of-
ficer must have had constitutional grounds to forcibly stop the per-
son in the first place.6" Moreover, where such a stop is reasonable,
"the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason
for the stop is . . . an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence."'6
Therefore, with the Terry decision, the Court expressed a willing-
ness to look at the Fourth Amendment as a more flexible provision
that could be applied on a graduated basis.65
In Sibron v. New York, 6 the Court faced a similar police action
under somewhat different circumstances. In Sibron, a Brooklyn po-
lice officer observed Sibron talking to several known drug addicts
between the hours of four p.m. and midnight.67 The officer also saw
Sibron enter a restaurant and converse with three more known ad-
dicts.6 8 The officer then confronted Sibron, ordered him outside, and
said, "[y]ou know what I am after."6 9 When Sibron only mumbled
something and reached into his pocket, the officer simultaneously
reached into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several packets of her-
oin.7 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, held that the
search in this case was unlawful because the officer was searching
for narcotics rather than acting out of fear for his own safety.71 Sig-
nificantly, in a concurring opinion Justice Harlan pointed out that
the need for immediate action must be taken into account when de-
termining whether there are reasonable grounds for a forcible intru-
sion.72 In Sibron, he noted, there was no such exigency.7
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Ashdown, supra note 33, at 1296. Professor Ashdown also notes that since Terry, the Court
has relied on the reasonableness clause provision of the Fourth Amendment to reduce search and
seizure protection in cases of traffic arrests. Ashdown, supra note 33, at 1297 n.37 (citing Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (authorizing police officer to order traffic violator out of
vehicle with no basis for suspicion), and in cases of border patrol searches; United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (authorizing border patrol's routine stopping of vehicles with no
individualized suspicion)).
66. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
67. Id. at 45.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 65-66.
72. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id. Professor LaFave points out that the Court was undoubtedly influenced by the nature of
the crimes in Terry and Sibron. LaFave, supra note 53, at 58-59. In Terry. the observation period
was short (about twelve minutes) and the crime suspected was robbery. Id. The Court concluded
that it would have been poor police work for the officer to have failed to investigate. Id. Con-
versely, in Sibron, the suspect was monitored continuously for an eight hour period in an area
[Vol. 44:167
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In Peters v. New York,"' the Court addressed a case involving a
New York City police officer who heard a noise outside his door
while at home one afternoon.7 5 He went to his peephole to see what
was happening and saw two strangers moving suspiciously toward
the stairway.76 After calling the police, he looked out again, and saw
the suspects headed for the stairway." Believing that they were in
the building to commit a burglary, the officer entered the hallway,
at which point the two men ran down the stairs.78 The officer chased
them and seized Peters who could not give an adequate explanation
as to why he was in the building.79 The officer then patted him down
and felt what seemed to be a knife in his pocket.80 The officer re-
moved the object, which turned out to be a plastic envelope contain-
ing burglary tools.8'
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, held that it was not
necessary to reach the stop and frisk issue in this case, as the of-
ficer's search of Peters was incident to a lawful arrest.8 2 Justice
Harlan concurred and wrote separately because he maintained that
the officer, under the circumstances, lacked probable cause to arrest
Peters.83 Instead, Justice Harlan preferred affirming Peter's convic-
tion on the grounds that the officer had reasonable cause to make a
forced stop.84 Justice Harlan stated that once this stop was made,
the frisk was only done for the purpose of turning up weapons, and
that if the frisk is lawful, the State is entitled to use any contraband
that appears.85 Thus, because the officer was looking for a knife
when he found the burglary tools, the tools were admissible fruits of
that legal stop and frisk.8 6
frequented by drug addicts, and was seen associating with several addicts during this time. Id.
The Court made no suggestion that it would have been "poor police work" on the officer's part not
to have investigated. Id.
74. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
75. Id. at 48.
76. id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 49.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. id.
82. Id. at 66. A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the "well-delineated" exceptions
referred to in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See supra note 30 (listing exam-
ples of exceptions).
83. Peters, 392 U.S. at 75-76.
84. Id. at 77-78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 79.
86. Id. at 67.
1994]
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When viewed together, one may draw certain conclusions from
the above three cases. First, a police officer may forcibly stop a citi-
zen and briefly detain him for the purpose of investigating criminal
behavior without any showing of probable cause.87 Second, only a
reasonable suspicion will give rise to a legitimate "stop."8 8 Third, in
the course of such a stop, the officer may frisk the citizen when he
has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and is in a
position to harm the officer or others.8 9 Fourth, an unparticularized
suspicion or hunch may not be the foundation for a stop and frisk; it
must be based upon reasonable inferences which the officer may
draw from the facts in light of his experience.90 Fifth, the search
must be circumscribed appropriately; it may not be a search for
contraband or any other items besides weapons that a suspect might
use to harm the officer or others.9" Sixth, courts will consider the
immediacy of the situation in evaluating the propriety of a stop and
frisk.92 Finally, even though the police officer finds something other
than a weapon as a result of the frisk, the government may use that
item against the suspect if the stop and frisk were lawful and appro-
priately circumscribed. 93 The plain view exception to the warrant
requirement is frequently used in conjunction with the stop and frisk
exception to justify a search. This concept is discussed below.
D. The Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine, another exception to the Warrant
Clause, allows a police officer to seize an object if he is where he has
a lawful right to be and has lawful access to an object that is in
plain view and whose incriminating nature is immediately appar-
ent.9 This section discusses the Court's acceptance and subsequent
87. Terry, 392 U.S at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring); Minor K. Wilson, "Stop and Frisk" -
Trends in Recent Fourth Amendment Decisions, 1968 CI. B. REC. 73, 79.
88. Peters, 392 U.S. at 77-78 (Harlan, J., concurring); Wilson, supra note 87, at 79.
89. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Wilson, supra note 87, at 79.
90. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Wilson, supra note 87, at 79.
91. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (holding that Terry
does not allow a search for anything but weapons); Wilson, supra note 87, at 79 (noting the
Court's approval of the frisks in Terry and Peters, in which the officers were looking for weapons,
and the search in Sibron, where the focus was narcotics).
92. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Wilson,
supra note 87, at 79 (noting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sibron pointing to the lack of need
for immediate action).
93. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49 (1968); Wilson, supra note 87, at 79.
94. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
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modification of this doctrine.
A plurality of the Court first recognized the existence of the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire.95 Although the holding in Coolidge did not apply the
plain view exception in that case,9" the Court articulated the stan-
dard and its requirements as follows. First, the initial intrusion by
the officer must be lawful; the plain view justification by itself would
never be sufficient to justify a warrantless seizure. 7 Second, it must
be immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence of a
crime before them.98 Third, the discovery of the evidence must be
inadvertent.99
In the next case addressing this doctrine, Texas v. Brown,100 a
plurality of the Court upheld a police officer's seizure of contraband
as justified under the plain view exception.10' In Brown, a police
officer stopped the defendant's automobile pursuant to a routine
driver's license check.'02 While waiting for the defendant to produce
his license, the officer shined his flashlight into the defendant's car
and saw an opaque green party balloon in the defendant's hand. 0 3
Because of his previous experience in drug arrests, the officer recog-
nized the balloon as a common method for packaging narcotics. 0 4
Upon seeing the balloon, the officer moved to better see the interior
of the defendant's car.10 5 From his new vantage point, he was able
to see several small plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder,
and a bag of balloons.' 0 6 The officer then ordered the defendant out
of the car, arrested him, and seized the balloon, which turned out to
95. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
96. Id. at 472.
97. Id. at 467-68. Therefore, the plain view exception must always operate in conjunction with
some other justification for a search - either a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant re-
quirement. Id.
98. Id. at 466.
99. Id. at 469. Although this requirement retained vitality for almost two decades, Justice
Stewart's initial discussion regarding it was only joined by three other members of the Court.
Therefore, that portion of the opinion is not binding precedent, and courts need not require inad-
vertence in evaluating plain view seizures. Joel Schwartz, Note, The Inadvertence Requirement of
the Plain View Doctrine in Horton v. California: A Foreseeable End?, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 225, 227
(1992). The Court eventually abandoned this requirement. Id. at 225.
100. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
101. Id. at 743.
102. Id. at 733.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 734.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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contain heroin, and the other evidence.1"'
Applying the three part plain view test articulated in Coolidge,
08
the Court first stated that the officer was lawfully where he had a
right to be, as the initial stop of the defendant's vehicle was justified
as a license check.109 Second, the Court found that the incriminat-
ing nature of the balloon was immediately apparent to the officer.110
The Court clarified that this prong of the test did not mandate that
the officer "know" that the item in question was contraband."' In-
stead, the Court stated that the seizure of property in plain view
was presumptively reasonable provided that there was probable
cause to associate the property with criminality." 2 The Court then
held that the record before them indicated that the officer had prob-
able cause to believe that the balloon in the defendant's hand con-
tained contraband." 3 Finally, the Court held that the officer's dis-
covery of the contraband was inadvertent, as the officer did not
know in advance that the defendant's car would contain contra-
band. " As all three of the requirements for invocation of the plain
view doctrine were met, the Court held that the seizure was
justified." 5
The Court further developed this doctrine in Arizona v. Hicks," 6
by unequivocally stating that an officer must have probable cause
that the object in question is evidence of criminality before he can
107. Id. at 735.
108. 403 U.S. 443, 465-70 (1971). While the Court agreed that invocation of the test was
appropriate here, it pointed out that the Coolidge opinion had only garnered a plurality of the
Court, and as such, was not binding precedent. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737. The Court clarified that
the plain view doctrine was not an independent exception to the warrant clause, but an extension
of whatever was the original justification for the officer's access to the object. Id. at 738-39.
109. Brown, 460 U.S. at 739.
110. Id. at 741-42.
111. Id.
112. Id. The Court here was expressing its disagreement with the lower court it reversed, which
held that the "immediately apparent" prong of the plain view test required that the officer have a
near certainty that the objects in question were seizable. Id.
113. Id. at 742. In arriving at this determination, the Court pointed to the officer's testimony
which indicated that through his previous experience and his discussions with others, he was
aware that balloons tied in the manner of the one carried by the defendant were commonly used
to carry narcotics. Id. at 742-43.
114. Id. at 743. The Court acknowledged that the police may have had a generalized expecta-
tion that some of the cars that they stopped in this area may have contained narcotics, but stated
that this generalized suspicion was not sufficient to defeat the inadvertency requirement. Id. at
743-44.
115. Id. at 743.
116. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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further search that object. 117 In Hicks, the Court held that the
seizure of stereo equipment from the defendant's apartment was in-
valid because it was seized pursuant to an illegal search."' In that
case, the officers were in the defendant's apartment in response to
gunfire from that apartment." 9 While there, one of the officers no-
ticed two sets of expensive stereo equipment which seemed out of
place in the small squalid apartment. 2 0 Suspecting that the equip-
ment was stolen, the officer recorded the serial numbers, moving a
turntable to do so. 12  On being advised that the turntable was stolen,
the officer seized it.' 22
The Court held that this search was an improper exercise of the
plain view doctrine, stating for the first time that an officer must
have probable cause to believe that the property in question is con-
traband before an officer may legally seize it.' 23 Here, the Court
held, the officer only had a reasonable suspicion that the equipment
was stolen, a quantum of suspicion something less than probable
cause.1 24 Because of the lack of probable cause, the officer's addi-
tional search - the moving of the turntable to determine its serial
number - was improper, thereby rendering seizure of the turntable
unlawful.2 5 Justice White concurred in Hicks, criticizing the inad-
vertency requirement and clarifying that inadvertency had not been
addressed in the case.'12 The criticism turned out to be prescient, as
only three years later the Court rejected that requirement in Horton
117. Id. at 326.
118. Id. at 326-29.
119. Id. at 323.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 326. Justice Scalia stated that to use any other standard than probable cause would
"cut the 'plain view' doctrine loose from its theoretical and practical moorings." Id. This was
because there was no reason why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds, during
an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been necessary to obtain a warrant for that
same object had the officers known it was on the premises. Id. at 327.
124. Id. at 326. The Court stated that the State had conceded that the officer only possessed a
reasonable suspicion that the turntable was stolen. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 18-19).
125. Id. at 327. Justice O'Connor dissented, differentiating between a "full-blown search,"
which she agreed necessitates probable cause, and a "cursory inspection of an item in plain view,"
which should be allowed on reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a crime. Id. at 333
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The search at bar, she stated, was clearly of the latter type. Id. at 339.
126. Id. at 329-30 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated that the inadvertent discovery
"requirement" of the plain view doctrine had never been accepted by a judgment supported by a
majority of the Court, and that he therefore did not accept the assertion that evidence seized in
plain view must have been inadvertently discovered in order to satisfy the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
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v. California.127
In Horton, the Court finally abandoned the inadvertency require-
ment as contrary to the objective nature of the plain view excep-
tion, 8 and unnecessary in light of already existing rules circum-
scribing the original search.' 29 The Court clarified the requirements
for a plain view search; these requirements represent the current
state of the law.' 30 First, the officer must have comported with the
Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which he could
plainly view the evidence.'' Second, the incriminating nature of the
evidence must have been immediately apparent." 2 Third, the officer
must have had a lawful right of access to the object itself.'8 3
E. The Confluence of Stop and Frisk and Plain View
The preceding discussion of the plain view doctrine explained that
the doctrine must be discussed in conjunction with a lawful justifica-
tion for the original search.3 This section discusses cases in which
a lawful search and seizure based on the stop and frisk exception
was extended by the plain view doctrine. An understanding of how
the stop and frisk exception was extended by the plain view doctrine
provides a foundation for explaining how courts have extended this
confluence to create the plain feel doctrine.' 35
In Michigan v. Long,' the Court sanctioned a stop and frisk pro-
127. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
128. Id. at 138.
129. In the case of a warrant - the requirement that a warrant be set out with particularity,
id. at 139 (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)), and in the case of a warrantless
search - the requirement that such a search be limited by the exigencies which justified its
initiation, id. at 139-40 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332-34 (1990)).
130. Id. at 136-37.
131. Id. at 136.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 137. Justice Stevens pointed out that this requirement is simply a corollary to the
principle that "no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent
,exigent circumstances.'" Id. at 137 n.7. One commentator noted that the Horton Court's dismis-
sal of the inadvertence requirement could encourage planned warrantless searches or pretextual
seizures. This could occur when an officer wished to seize a certain article but lacked probable
cause to gain a search warrant. The officer could obtain a warrant for an item in the same house
that he does have probable cause to search for. Once inside the house the officer could make a
plain view seizure of the object he was really seeking. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 239.
134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that the plain view justification
alone is never sufficient to justify a warrantless seizure).
135. See infra notes 156-234 and accompanying text (discussing the plain feel exception).
136. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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tective examination of an automobile. 13 7 While conducting a protec-
tive search of the suspect and the passenger compartment of his au-
tomobile, the officer found contraband in plain view and seized it.138
In this case, officers stopped Long after they saw him drive into a
ditch."3 9 By the time the officers got to him, Long was out of the car
and appeared intoxicated. 40 One of the officers shined a light inside
the car and saw a hunting knife.' 4' Upon seeing this knife, the of-
ficers conducted a protective search of Long's person and of the
car's passenger compartment. 4" The officers found a bag of mari-
juana in the car and seized it.'"
The Court subjected the officers' conduct to the reasonableness
analysis articulated in Terry,,4  and concluded that "[i]n this case,
the officers did not act unreasonably in taking preventive measures
to ensure that there were no other weapons within Long's immediate
grasp before permitting him to re-enter his automobile."'14  Thus,
the Court held that a search of the passenger compartment for
weapons is permissible under Terry, as long as the officers possess
an articulable and reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially
dangerous. 40 Additionally, and most important for the purposes of
this analysis, the Court implicitly sanctioned the use of the plain
137. Id. at 1034-35.
138. Id. at 1036.
139. Id. at 1035.
140. Id. at 1036.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
145. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051. One commentator has criticized this holding as one that
"stretches doctrine to justify what is to be considered reasonable behavior by the police," even
though such conduct may have been inconsistent with prior holdings. Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1468, 1484 n.83 (1985). He further notes
that while this police behavior was not unreasonable given all the circumstances, it is difficult to
see how this decision follows from Terry. Id. While Terry only sanctioned a limited frisk for
weapons, Long approved a full search of a car's passenger compartment based on a combination of
reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances even though the suspect was not in the car. Id.
Another commentator notes that based on the facts on the record in Long, it is not ever clear that
the officers feared for their safety. Paula C. Tredeau, Casenote, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 443, 455-56
(1984). Indeed, the knife involved was legal, the suspect was cooperative, and furthermore, had no
weapons on his person. Id.
146. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051. A commentator notes that although the Court in Long purported
to follow Terry, the limitations on the vehicle search in Long are not as clearly defined as were the
standards in Terry. Furthermore, as Terry has expanded past its original guidelines, the Court
should expect that Long also will, and this failure to set definitive limitations on the scope of a
vehicle frisk makes the Long decision more vulnerable to unintended extensions. Tredeau, supra
note 145, at 453-55.
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view doctrine as an extension of the Terry stop and frisk exception
to the Warrant Clause.' 4 7
Again, in United States v. Hensley, 48 the Court held that the
seizure of evidence in plain view was legitimate during the course of
a Terry frisk of an automobile passenger compartment.14 9 In Hens-
ley, officers stopped the defendant's car because they believed, based
on a "wanted flyer," that there might be a warrant out for his ai-
rest.' 50 Upon approaching the car, one of the officers noticed a gun
protruding from under a seat. 5 ' A subsequent search of the car pro-
duced two more guns.' 52 The Court first stated that the "wanted
flyer" provided sufficient justification for the officers to stop the de-
fendant.'53 The Court went on to state that once the officers stopped
the defendant, they were entitled to search the passenger compart-
ment for weapons, as the suspects were reported to be "armed and
dangerous."' 54 Finally, the Court held that, in the course of such a
search, the officers were entitled to seize evidence discovered in
plain view during the course of such stop. 55
The above two cases demonstrate the way in which the plain view
doctrine is used to "extend" a lawful Terry search. The following
section demonstrates how the plain feel exception is derived from
this extension.
F. The Plain Feel Exception
This exception to the warrant requirement is derived by analogy
from the confluence of the stop and frisk and the plain view excep-
147. "If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the of-
ficer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to
ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such cir-
cumstances." Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736 (1983); Michi-
gan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)).
The Court wrote further, however, to reiterate the'limitations of Terry. Id. at 1050 n.14. The
Court clarified that the decision in Long did not sanction an automobile search whenever a police
officer conducts an investigative stop. Id. The Court stated that a Terry search "is not justified by
any need to [protect] .. .evidence . . . .The sole justification of the search . . . is the protec-
tion of police officers and others nearby." Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).
148. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
149. Id. at 235-36.
150. Id. at 223-24.
151. Id. at 224.
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id. at 234-35.
154. Id. at 235.
155. Id.
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tions delineated above.' 56 It allows a police officer, while conducting
a Terry frisk, to seize evidence that she "plainly feels" through the
individual's clothing if it is immediately apparent to the officer that
what she feels is contraband. 57 Some commentators have described
this exception as an inappropriate broadening of the Terry stop and
frisk doctrine,' 58 while others accept it as a "common sense" ana-
logue to the plain view doctrine. 159
Several state and federal courts had ruled on the legitimacy of
such an exception to the Warrant Clause prior to the landmark Su-
preme Court case which is the subject of this article. 60 This section
first discusses cases accepting the plain feel exception, and then
cases declining to find such an exception. 16'
1. Cases Recognizing a Plain Feel Exception
In United States v. Williams,'62 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that when an officer
"plainly felt" that a bag contained cocaine while in the course of a
Terry search, he was justified in searching the bag. 6 a In this case,
Williams was sitting in the drivers seat of a parked car in Washing-
ton, D.C., when four police officers driving an unmarked van drove
up alongside the car and stopped.6 The officers noticed that Wil-
liams and the front seat passenger were bent over and concentrating
on something in their laps. 165 On the basis of their experience in
that neighborhood, the officers suspected that a drug transaction
was transpiring. 6 As the officers approached the car to request that
156. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993) (discussing plain view
seizures in the context of Terry stops and stating that "this doctrine has an obvious application by
analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an
otherwise lawful search").
157. Id. at 2137.
158. See, e.g., Lantz, supra note 21, at 558 ("Terry cannot be used to justify a stop that leads
to a frisk which exceeds Terry's limited purpose of protecting the officer and bystanders.").
159. See, e.g., Katherine W. Iverson, Comment, "Plain Feel": A Common Sense Proposal Fol-
lowing State v. Dickerson, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 247, 280 (1992) (noting that without such an
exception, police may seize objects they see from a lawful vantage point, but must disregard that
which they feel from a lawful vantage point).
160. See infra notes 162-232 and accompanying text.
161. The courts and literature have used the terms "plain touch" and "plain feel" interchange-
ably. This Note refers to the doctrine as the plain feel doctrine.
162. 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
163. Id. at 1185-86.
164. Id. at 1176.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Williams display his driver's license and registration, they saw Wil-
liams shove a paper bag under his leg. 167 One officer then had Wil-
liams step out of the car, believing that the paper bag might contain
a weapon. 168 When Williams exited the car he attempted to flip the
bag into the back seat, but he failed and it landed in front. 69 At
this point, one of the officers picked the bag up and felt it with both
hands. 17 0 He later testified that on the basis of his touching the bag
and his experience and training in narcotics detection that he be-
lieved that there were several pouches of heroin inside the bag.'
The officer opened the bag, found several pouches of heroin, and
then arrested Williams. 2
The court, in evaluating this case, set out a three part test for
determining the legitimacy of a plain feel search.7M First, the officer
must be legally authorized to touch the container at the outset.'74
Second, the doctrine does not sanction the use of the sense of touch
beyond that justified by the original contact with the container (i.e.
the officer is not permitted to continue to manipulate the container
in an effort to discern its contents). 7 5 Third, the contents of a pack-
age cannot be deemed in plain view'7 6 unless a lawful touching con-
vinces the officer to a reasonable certainty that the container holds
contraband or evidence of a crime. 7 7 Applying this test to the facts
in the instant case, the court held that the seizure was valid under
the plain feel exception.7 8
Similarly, in State v. Washington, 79 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin upheld a plain feel search in which an officer found the fruits
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1177.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1184.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The court here refers to the object discovered pursuant to the plain feel search as having
been in plain view. Id.
177. Id. at 1184-85. One commentator notes that this final requirement represents a higher
standard than the probable cause required for traditional plain view seizure. Judith E. Baylinson,
Recent Decision, Pennsylvania Circumvents the Plain View Doctrine in a Warrantless Search -
Commonwealth v. Smith, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 251, 259 n.85 (1991). Another commentator suggests
that the standard has been elevated to "protect against the inherently less immediate perception
gained through the sense of touch." Iverson, supra note 159, at 271.
178. Williams, 822 F.2d at 1185-86.
179. 396 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1986).
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of a burglary on defendant Washington's person in the course of a
Terry stop."8 ' In this case, Washington was a passenger in a car
that was stopped by the police pursuant to the burglary of a nearby
jewelry store.181 The officer then ordered Washington out of the car,
and because he suspected Washington of a felony, the officer Terry
frisked him to see if he was carrying any weapons. 182 During the
course of the frisk, the officer felt three watches in Washington's
pocket and placed him under arrest.' 83
The court first determined that the officer was justified in stop-
ping Washington.184 This established, the court stated that the best
analysis of the facts was under the plain view exception to the war-
rant requirement, 85 and then clarified that the requirement that the
evidence be in plain view would be "fulfilled by the fact that the
watches were exposed to the officer's sense of touch or view."1 86 The
court went on to say that "[e]vidence in plain view is not restricted
to items which can only be seen, but rather includes . . . all of the
human senses, smell, sight, touch, hearing and taste. 187 In this
case, the officer was able to feel the three watches and determine
their identity using his sense of touch. Therefore, according to the
court, they were seizable pursuant to the plain view doctrine.188 Al-
180. Id. at 163.
181. Id. at 158.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 161.
185. Id. The court then set out the criteria for plain view seizure of evidence in Wisconsin as
follows:
(1) The officer must have a prior justification for being in the position from which the
'plain view' discovery was made; (2) The evidence must be in plain view of the discov-
ering officer; (3) The discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent; and (4) The item
seized, in itself or in itself with facts known to the officer at the time of the seizure,
provides probable cause to believe there is a connection between the evidence and
criminal activity.
Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 161-62.
188. Id. at 162. The plain feel exception has been criticized on the ground that it allows the
inherent opportunity for an officer to alter his testimony at suppression hearings. See, e.g., Lantz,
supra note 21, at 577-79 (pointing to the fact that the officer's testimony differed at two different
suppression hearings in Washington, causing one concurring justice to characterize the case as
replete with confusion). In justification of the plain feel exception, Professor LaFave states:
Assuming the object discovered in the pat-down does not feel like a weapon, this only
means that a further search may not be justified under a Terry analysis. There re-
mains the possibility that the feel of the object, together with other suspicious circum-
stances, will amount to probable cause that the object is contraband or some other
items subject to seizure, in which case there may be a further search based upon that
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though the court did not expressly use the language, "plain feel"
search, the court's statement that plain view encompasses what is
"exposed to the officer's sense of touch or view" clarifies that they
were extending the plain view doctrine to include its plain feel
analogue.189
Finally, in State v. Guy,' a police officer was conducting a law-
ful Terry search of a defendant when she felt a lump in the defend-
ant's pocket that she identified as feeling "soft," like cocaine or ma-
rijuana. 9 ' The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the officer's
seizure of the object, which turned out to be cocaine, was lawful
because there can be "no reasonable expectation of privacy in an
item that is in plain view." '92 Therefore, the court stated, "no search
occurs when an officer views or feels evidence that is in plain
view."198
2. Cases Declining to Find a Plain Feel Exception
The highest court of New York refused to find a plain feel excep-
tion to the warrant requirement in People v. Diaz.'94 The New York
Court of Appeals held that an officer's removal of 18 vials of crack
cocaine from the defendant's pocket based on a plain feel extension
of a Terry frisk was impermissible. 95 The court stated that the
analogy of plain view to plain feel did not withstand analysis under
either the New York or Federal Constitutions.'96
The court first reasoned that "[u]nlike the item in plain view in
which the owner has no privacy expectation, the owner of an item
concealed by clothing . . . retains a legitimate expectation that the
item's existence . . .will remain private.' 91 7 Moreover, the court
pointed out that the basic premise of the plain view exception, that
the items in plain view may be seized with no additional intrusion,
probable cause.
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.4, at 66 (Supp. 1984), cited in Washington, 396
N.W.2d at 162.
189. Washington, 396 N.W.2d at 161.
190. 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993).
191. Id. at 313.
192. Id. at 317 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)).
193. Id.
194. 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993).
195. Id. at 300.
196. Id. at 300-01.
197. Id. at 301.
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could not support the plain feel exception.' 98 This was so because
even if the initial touching that discovered the contraband was com-
pletely justified, the discovery and seizure of the items would neces-
sitate an additional intrusion that entailed reaching into the sus-
pect's clothing to remove the object. 199 Finally, the court pointed to
pragmatic considerations as well, noting that "[t]he identity and
criminal nature of a concealed object are not likely to be discernable
upon a mere touch or pat within the scope of the intrusion author-
ized by Terry."2 °
Similarly, in State v. Broadnax,2 °0 the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, sitting en banc, reversed the defendant's conviction for ille-
gal possession of narcotics, holding that the plain touch search that
led to the seizure of the narcotics in that case was unconstitu-
tional. 202 In Broadnax, defendant Thompson was a guest in the
home of defendant Broadnax when police officers entered the resi-
dence to search it pursuant to a search warrant. 0 3 While inside the
home, one of the officers conducted a pat-down search of Thomp-
son.2 04 During this initial cursory search, the officer felt a small
bulge in Thompson's shirt pocket,20 5 reached into Thompson's
pocket and removed a balloon containing heroin. 0 6 Thompson was
subsequently arrested and convicted of illegal possession of heroin
and his conviction was affirmed by the Washington Court of
Appeals.20 7
The Supreme Court of Washington overturned Thompson's con-
viction, holding that the officer's pat search of Thompson, and sub-
sequent seizure of heroin violated Thompson's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 08 In so
holding, the court noted that the lower court relied on a plain view
198. Id. at 302.
199. Id.
200. Id. The court went so far as to state that "the very concept of 'plain touch' is a contradic-
tion in terms: the idea of plainness cannot logically be associated with information concerning a
concealed item which is available only through the sensory perceptions of someone who touches
it." Id.
201. 654 P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982) (en banc).
202. Id. at 99.
203. Id. at 98-99.
204. Id. at 99.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 98.
208. Id. at 105.
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doctrine analogue in holding the search constitutional." 9 The court
went on to say that the "immediate knowledge" prong of the plain
view test could never be met if "the sense of touch is relied upon
exclusively for the recognition of contraband."21 0 This was because
the tactile sense would usually not result in the immediate knowl-
edge of the nature of an item.2 ' The court also pointed out that the
officer who conducted the search testified at trial that he did not
believe the object in Thompson's pocket was a weapon.212 Because
the tactile sense could not provide the requisite "immediate knowl-
edge" to justify the search and seizure, the court held that the
search was unconstitutional and consequently vacated Thompson's
conviction.21 3
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Marconi,21 4 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held unconstitutional the seizure of
methamphetamine,2 1 5 discovered during a pat search of the defend-
ant for weapons.21 6 In Marconi, the police officer's suspicions were
aroused upon seeing the defendant exit his car and vomit.217 After
observing the defendant for several more minutes, the officer drove
over to investigate. 218 The officer recognized the defendant as some-
one who had previously been charged with drugs and weapons of-
fenses, and observed the defendant conceal something in the rear of
his pants.21 9 Fearing for his safety, the officer performed a frisk of
the defendant to determine if he was carrying weapons. 220 Although
he felt no weapon, the officer felt an object in the defendant's rear
pants pocket.22' He then reached into that pocket and retrieved two
plastic bags containing methamphetamine,222 and then arrested the
209. Id. at 102. The court identified the three requirements of the plain view test as follows: (1)
a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) an inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence; and
(3) immediate knowledge by police that they have evidence before them. Id; see also supra notes
94-133 and accompanying text (discussing the plain view doctrine at length).
210. Broadnax. 654 P.2d at 102.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 101. The officer testified that he felt "a small bulge that . . . gives." Id.
213. Id. at 105.
214. 597 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992).
215. Methamphetamine is a synthetic drug that produces prominent central stimulant reac-
tions. WILLIAM STATSKY, LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY 490 (1985).
216. Marconi, 597 A.2d at 624.
217. Id. at 617.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 618 n.4.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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defendant.22 3 Upon defendant's subsequent motion, the trial court
suppressed the seized methamphetamine.224
On appeal, the Superior Court held the search unconstitutional
because it exceeded the limits set forth by the Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio. 25 The Superior Court held that the facts of the in-
stant case did not comport with Terry's strict requirement that a
frisk based upon reasonable suspicion be narrowly confined to a
search for weapons and nothing else.226 The court expressly declined
to adopt, under the facts of the present case, a plain feel exception
to the warrant requirement.227 The court reasoned that any addi-
tional search of the defendant in this case, above and beyond the
frisk, required probable cause.22 ' The court further stated that it
would be inconsistent to apply a "plain touch" exception to individu-
als because in such a situation probable cause could never exist.229
The court went on to state that sanctioning a search under the facts
of this case would be tantamount to allowing police officers to as-
sume that all small objects in a person's pocket were drugs.230 The
court refused to open such a door.2 31 Thus, the court upheld the trial
court's suppression of the methamphetamine.232
As the preceding cases illustrate, up to this point, there had been
a significant split in both the state and federal courts as to the ap-
propriateness and treatment under the Fourth Amendment of a
plain feel exception to the Warrant Clause.23 3 The Supreme Court
223. Id.
224. Id. at 617.
225. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
226. Marconi, 597 A.2d at 620 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)). The court also
clarified that the officer testified at trial that he did not feel anything on the defendant's body that
felt remotely like a weapon. Id. at 622.
227. Id. The court here stated that the items seized by the officer could have been anything at
all, including a button or an aspirin. Id. at 623.
228. Id. The court here clarified that "[pirobable cause is the probability of criminal conduct,
not the possibility of criminal conduct." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa.
1985)).
229. Id. at 623 nn.16-17.
230. Id. at 623.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 624.
233. For examples of cases that invalidated searches, see State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983); Hicks v. State, 631 A.2d 6 (Del. 1993); Howard v. State, 623 So. 2d 1240 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Spann, 604 N.E.2d 1138 (I11. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Slan, 632
So. 2d 749 (La. 1994); State v. Parker, 622 So. 2d 791 (La. Ct. App. 1993), writ denied, 627 So.
2d 660 (La. 1993); State v. Thornton, 621 So. 2d 173 (La. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Sanders, 435
S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Coons, 627 A.2d 1064 (N.H. 1993); State v. Vasquez,
815 P.2d 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 1178 (N.M. 1991); State v. Cloud,
1994]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
addressed and resolved this split in the landmark case of Minnesota
v. Dickerson.2"4 The next section discusses this holding and subse-
quent lower court decisions applying Dickerson.
II. SUBJECT OPINION - MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON
23 5
A. Facts
In November of 1989, two Minneapolis police officers observed
the defendant leaving what they knew from past experience to be a
"crack house. '23 6 The defendant walked toward the patrol car, and
upon spotting it, halted and began walking in the opposite direc-
tion.237 Based upon these actions, the officers stopped the defendant
for further investigation and forced him to submit to a patdown
search.238 Although the search yielded no weapons, the officer con-
ducting the search felt a lump in the defendant's pocket that he
believed, after manipulating the object extensively with his fingers,
to be crack cocaine. 281 He then reached into the defendant's pocket
and retrieved what did indeed turn out to be a plastic bag contain-
ing crack cocaine. 40 The defendant was then arrested and charged
with the possession of a controlled substance.24'
632 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); In re S.D., 633 A.2d 172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). See also
People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993) (invalidating search and refusing to accept the plain
feel exception); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (invalidating search and
declining to adopt plain feel exception).
For examples of cases that upheld these searches as valid, see People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96
(Cal. 1983); People v. Limon, 17 Cal. App. 4th 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Waterbury,
191 Cal. Rptr. 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Dickerson v. State, 620 A.2d 857 (Del. Super. Ct.
1993); Walker v. State, No. 3071991, 1992 WL 115945 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1992); Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 631 A.2d 1335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). See also State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d
822 (Haw. 1984) (accepting plain feel doctrine); Jordan v. State, 531 A.2d 1028 (Md. 1987)
(upholding container search); State v. Branch, No. CX-93-135, 1993 WL 430391 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 26, 1993) (upholding search for weapon); State v. Rahmon, No. 63913, 1993 WL
437614 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1993) (upholding search for weapon).
234. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2133.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. At trial, the officer testified: "I felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I ex-
amined it with my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane." Id.
240. Id. at 2133-34. The plastic bag contained one piece of crack cocaine weighing 0.2 gram.
Id.
241. Id. at 2134.
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B. Procedural History
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the
seized cocaine."" The trial court held that the stop and frisk of the
defendant were proper under Terry and additionally found that the
"plain feel" doctrine justified the officer's seizure of the cocaine
under the Fourth Amendment. 43 The trial court therefore denied
the motion to suppress. " ' The case then proceeded to trial and the
defendant was found guilty. ' On appeal, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed. 4 The appellate court agreed that the officer had
constitutional justification under Terry to stop and frisk the defend-
ant because the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant was engaged in criminality and that he might be armed
and dangerous.247 The appellate court, however, declined to accept
the "plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment, and held that
the officers had overstepped the bounds of Terry in seizing the
cocaine. 48
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 2 49 agreeing with the ap-
pellate court that the stop and frisk were legitimate, but that the
seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional. 50 The court declined to
extend the plain view doctrine to the sense of touch based on the
premise that sight and touch are not equivalent senses.2 51 The court
justified this conclusion on two grounds. First, that "the sense of
touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of
sight," and second, that "the sense of touch is far more intrusive
into the personal privacy that is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment. ' 2 5 Thus, the court held that because there was no sighting of
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) affd, 981 N.W.2d 840
(Minn. 1992), affid, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
247. Id. at 465.
248. Id. at 466-67. The appellate court stressed that an officer may only exceed the scope of a
limited frisk and reach into the suspect's clothing for the purpose of retrieving an object thought
to be a weapon. Moreover, the court stated that "the better view is that a search is not permissible
when the object felt is soft in nature." Id.
249. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992) affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
250. Id. at 846.
251. Id. at 845.
252. Id. The court went on to elaborate that it was much different to actually see something in
someone's pocket, than to "pinch, squeeze and rub" that person's pocket to determine what is
inside. Id.
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any contraband, no presence of a weapon, and no effort by defend-
ant to hide anything, the police only had a Terry-type reasonable
suspicion. 53 Thus, once it was apparent that the defendant had no
weapon, the officer's additional intrusion, manipulating and remov-
ing the object, was not permissible under the Fourth Amendment. " 4
Consequently, the fruits of that impermissible search had to be sup-
pressed .2 5  The state then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court which granted certiorari. 5
C. Supreme Court
After reviewing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence over the last
three decades, 7 the Court held that, under limited circumstances,
contraband detected through the sense of touch during a patdown
search is admissible into evidence for two reasons. First, "Terry it-
self demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable of revealing the
nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure."25 8
The Court pointed out that the essence of Terry was that officers
would be able to utilize the sense of touch in detecting weapons.2 59
That was, in fact, exactly the situation in Terry." ' The Court also
noted that the fact that the sense of touch may be less reliable than
the sense of sight only meant that seizures of contraband based on
253. Id. at 846.
254. Id.
255. Id. Justice Coyne, in a strong dissent, expressed her willingness to accept the plain feel
exception. She stressed that a legitimate frisk entails a "careful exploration of the outer surfaces
of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons." Id. at 849 (emphasis
added by Justice Coyne) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). She went on to state
that the "simple act" of the officer in feeling the outline and shape of the lump in the instant case
was permissible under Terry, and furthermore, that because of the officer's extensive experience in
discovering crack cocaine during the course of such searches, the officer was "'absolutely sure'
that the substance was crack cocaine 'before' he reached into the pocket and removed it." Id. at
849. Therefore, Justice Coyne would have upheld this search as legitimate under Terry. Id. at
851. Justice Coyne also stated that "[l]aw enforcement is not a game in which liberty triumphs
whenever the policeman is defeated." Id. (citing Ernest L. Barrett Jr., Exclusion of Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Searches - A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REv. 565, 582
(1955)). Finally, Justice Coyne opined that "a policeman should not be compelled to ignore what
his senses - whether sight, sound, smell, taste, or touch - tell him in clear and unmistakable
language." Id.
256. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2134 (1993).
257. Id. at 2135-37.
258. Id. at 2137.
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (describing officer's pat-down of suspect
and discovery of gun in Terry).
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the sense of touch would less often be justifiable. 6' Second, the
Court disagreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court that such a
search was an invasion of privacy above and beyond the initial "stop
and frisk." ' 2 The Court reasoned that because the lawful frisk for
weapons sanctioned the initial search, the seizure of an additional
item whose identity is immediately apparent to the officer creates no
additional invasion of privacy.26 Hence, the Court held that the pri-
vacy interests of the suspect would not be advanced by a per se rule
barring the seizure of contraband plainly detected through the sense
of touch. 64
Applying these findings to the instant case, the Court held that
despite its holding that the plain feel exception is within the bounds
of the Fourth Amendment, the state court was correct in holding
that "the police officer . . . overstepped the bounds of the 'strictly
circumscribed' search for weapons allowed under Terry."' 21 5 While a
plain feel search is not per se unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"[h]ere, the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket
after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to
'the sole justification of the search [under Terry:] . . . the protec-
tion of the police officer and others nearby.' ,266 Therefore, the addi-
tional search was invalid because the illegal nature of the item in
the defendant's pocket was not immediately apparent to the of-
ficer. 26" Because the additional manipulation of the defendant's
pocket constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment,
the Court held that the subsequent seizure of cocaine was also un-
261. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. The Court was apparently satisfied that "the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that the item is contra-
band before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures." Id.
262. Id. at 2138.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 2138-39 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). The Court compared this search to
the search in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), which the Court found to be invalid because
the property's incriminating nature was not immediately apparent. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
The Court went on to point out that Hicks held that probable cause was necessary to allow any
additional search above and beyond the one in progress, even a cursory inspection. Id.; see also
supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text. (providing a detailed discussion of Hicks). This anal-
ogy that the Court drew to Hicks indicated that the search in Dickerson failed the immediately
apparent prong of the plain view test. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct at 2139. Moreover, it also clarified
that probable cause that a "felt" item is contraband is required before an officer is able to use the
plain feel exception to justify an additional search and/or seizure of that item. Id. at 2138.
267. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
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constitutional."' Therefore, while this case gave the Court the op-
portunity to sanction the use of the plain feel exception, it also
clearly limited its application of the plain feel exception to those
situations in which an officer remains within the bounds of Terry,2"9
and in which the incriminating nature of the object in question is so
immediately apparent as to rise to the level of probable cause.270
D. Lower Courts Subsequent Application of Dickerson
A survey of recent state and federal decisions illustrates that in
the wake of Dickerson, the lower courts have applied the plain feel
doctrine in a wide variety of ways.271  These varying approaches
form a spectrum, with one end giving much deference to the judg-
ment of the police officer, and the other end closely scrutinizing the
actions of the officer as well as all other relevant surrounding
facts.2 2 This section presents and analyzes the facts and holdings of
two of these cases, one from each end of the spectrum.
In State v. Buchanan,27 3 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld
the plain feel seizure of a baggie of cocaine from the defendant's
waistband as within the scope of a lawful Terry search, and there-
fore valid under the plain feel exception.274 In Buchanan, the officers
268. Id. at 2139. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he called into question the
constitutionality of the Terry frisk itself. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Looking to the intent of the
framers at the time of ratification, Justice Scalia interpreted the purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment to be "to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of
their property that existed when the provision was adopted - even if a later, less virtuous age
should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusions 'reasonable.'" Id. He then ex-
pressed doubt that the Terry frisk comported with such a standard, stating: "I frankly doubt,
moreover, whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have al-
lowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indig-
nity. ... Id. at 2140. He concluded, however, by conceding that the result in Terry was cor-
rect, even if the methodology was faulty, and stated that on that basis, "any evidence incidentally
discovered in the course of [such a search] would be admissible." Id. at 2141.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Blackmun and Thomas, concurred with the holdings of the
Court, but dissented from the Court's reversal of the judgment. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). The Chief Justice was of the opinion that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota should have been vacated, and that the case should have been remanded for
further proceedings in conformity with the Court's newly established plain feel methodology. Id.
269. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
270. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
271. See infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text (providing cases which take different ap-
proaches to the application of the Dickerson rule to specific factual situations).
272. See infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text (providing cases which take different ap-
proaches to the application of the Dickerson rule to specific factual situations).
273. 504 N.W.2d 400 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
274. Id. at 404.
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encountered the defendant outside a residence for which the officer
possessed a search warrant. 2 5 As the officer drove up, the defendant
began walking across the street.276 One of the officers ordered the
defendant to stop, and the other officer ordered the defendant to lie
face down and proceeded to handcuff him.2"' After asking the de-
fendant if he possessed drugs or weapons, one of the officers pro-
ceeded to pat down the defendant. 27 During this procedure, the of-
ficer felt what he believed to be a plastic baggie containing rice in
the defendant's waistband.2 9 The officer removed the baggie and
found that it contained nineteen packages of what was later deter-
mined to be cocaine.28 0 After pleading guilty to the crime of posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute, the defendant appealed,
challenging the search and seizure of the cocaine.28'
After noting that the stop and frisk complied with the require-
ments set forth in Terry,28 2 the appellate court turned to the defend-
ant's challenge of the "plain touch" seizure of the cocaine.283 Specif-
ically, the defendant claimed that "plain touch" seizures require
that the incriminating nature of the evidence be immediately appar-
ent, and that it was not plausible that the searching officer immedi-
ately knew that the bag of rice contained contraband.28 4 In refuting
this contention, the court pointed to the following elements that
must be present under Wisconsin law in order for a "plain touch"
search to be upheld:
(1) the evidence must be in "plain view;" (2) the officer
must have a prior justification for being in the position from
which [he or] she discovers the evidence in "plain view;"
and (3) the evidence seized, 'in itself or in itself with facts
known to the officer at the time of the seizure, [must pro-
vide] probable cause to believe there is a connection be-
tween the evidence and the criminal activity.'2 85
275. Id. at 401-02.
276. Id. at 402.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 402-04.
283. Id. at 404.
284. Id.
285. Id. (citing State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020
(1993)); see also supra note 176 (explaining the courts' usage of the term plain view in the plain
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In applying this test, the court first stated that there was no issue
as to the first two elements and turned to the issue of whether the
officer immediately recognized the incriminating nature of the bag-
gie.28" The court held that the officer had probable cause to believe
there was a connection between the baggie and criminal activity for
the following reasons: 1) the officer testified at the suppression hear-
ing that he immediately recognized that the bag contained contra-
band; 2) the officer had knowledge regarding the storage of cocaine;
and 3) the defendant was standing in front of premises which the
officer was about to search for cocaine."8 7 Therefore, the court af-
firmed the lower court and upheld the search.2"'
In State v. Beveridge,2' 9 a North Carolina appellate court vacated
a conviction because the search and seizure there did not comply
with the plain feel rule set forth in Dickerson.290 Significantly, to
arrive at this conclusion, the appellate court used a wholly different
methodology than that utilized by the court in Buchanan.29' In Bev-
eridge, two officers arrested the driver of an automobile for driving
while impaired.292 The defendant was a passenger in the vehicle and
was asked by one of the officers to exit and move to the rear of the
vehicle.293 The officer advised the defendant that he was not under
arrest, and then proceeded to pat him down.294 Upon doing so, the
officer felt what seemed to be a rolled up plastic bag,295 and directed
the defendant to remove it.296 Upon observing the plastic bag, the
officer could see that it contained a white powdery substance, later
determined to be cocaine. 97
Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court made several
detailed findings of fact including the following:
8) That Deputy John Gregory patted down the defendant
and felt what seemed to him to be a rolled up plastic baggie
feel test).
286. Buchanan, 504 N.W.2d at 404.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 436 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
290. Id. at 916.
291. 504 N.W.2d 400 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see supra text accompanying note 287 (noting
that the court in Buchanan accorded much deference to testimony of the officer).
292. Beveridge, 436 S.E.2d at 912.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 913.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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in the defendant's front pants pocket.
9) That Deputy John Gregory had received numerous hours
of training in the enforcement of the North Carolina Con-
trolled Substances Act and had participated in numerous
arrests for violations of said act.
10) That Deputy John Gregory was familiar with the area
. . . where the vehicle had been stopped and is an area in
which previous arrests have been made for controlled sub-
stances violations.
11) That Deputy Gregory had observed that the defendant
appeared to exhibit the effects of having consumed some
impairing substance and the effects were consistent with the
use of a controlled substance such as was customarily
stored in a rolled up plastic bag.
12) That Deputy Gregory asked the defendant what he had
in his pocket to which the defendant replied money, and the
defendant pulled some money out of his pocket.
13) That Deputy Gregory told the defendant that he could
still see something in the defendant's pocket and asked the
defendant to pull his pocket out.
15) That Defendant Gregory observed the defendant con-
ceal something in the palm of his hand.
16) That Deputy Gregory asked the defendant what he had
in his hand and then observed a plastic baggie containing a
white powdery substance which appeared to Deputy Greg-
ory to be cocaine. 98
Based on the above findings of fact, the trial court held that Deputy
Gregory had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant pos-
sessed illegal drugs.29 9 The defendant appealed the denial of his mo-
tion to suppress the cocaine.300
The appellate court listed in its opinion and took into considera-
tion all of the above findings of fact.30 1 The court then reviewed the
plain feel doctrine as delineated in Dickerson and concluded that
despite the officer's experience, the detailed facts elicited at the trial
level indicated that the officer did not know that the bag contained
298. Id. at 912-13.
299. Id. at 914.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 912-13.
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contraband until he asked the defendant to turn out his pockets.302
Therefore the search failed the "immediately apparent" require-
ment of the plain feel test.303 Accordingly, the search was held inva-
lid, and the lower court's decision was reversed.30 4
III. ANALYSIS
This section illustrates that the Supreme Court's decision in Dick-
erson is analytically troublesome for three reasons. First, Dickerson
condones the plain feel doctrine by accepting the tenuous premise
that it is a corollary or analogue to the previously sanctioned plain
view exception to the warrant requirement, particularly in situations
where the plain view exception is extended to a Terry stop and
frisk.305 This section considers why such an extension constitutes an
improper extension of the original Terry doctrine. 06
Second, even accepting the analytical framework for the plain feel
requirement outlined by the Court, any plain feel search is necessa-
rily confined by the three prong plain view test because the plain
feel doctrine is derived by analogy from the plain view doctrine.0 7
The third prong of this test requires that the officer feel an object
whose "contour or mass makes it immediately apparent."30 8 This
section shows that the nature of the tactile sense is such that the
possibility of meeting this requirement is at best de minimis, and at
worst, nonexistent.309
Finally, when viewed in isolation, this extension might not appear
to be a major step. However, when one examines the path the Court
has taken since the Terry decision in 1968 to arrive at this juncture,
it becomes apparent that the Court has strayed so far from the war-
rant requirement by fashioning exceptions based on the reasonable-
302. Id. at 916.
303. Id.
304. Id. The court elaborated, stating that "where, as here, 'an officer who is executing a valid
search for one item seizes a different item,' this court rightly 'has been sensitive to the danger...
that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the
equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at will.' " Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993)).
305. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
306. See infra notes 312-50 and accompanying text (explaining why the plain feel exception
constitutes an improper extension of Terry).
307. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
308. Id.
309. See infra notes 351-64 and accompanying text (explaining why the tactile sense is incom-
patible with the plain view doctrine).
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ness clause that the "well delineated exceptions" have nearly swal-
lowed the rule.810 This section illustrates that while individual
exceptions might appear analytically sound, in reality they are used
in conjunction with each other - risking erroneous deprivations of
personal liberties.3 11
A. The Plain Feel Doctrine is Based on an Improper Extension
of Terry
Although Terry stop and frisks may result in mistaken invasions
of privacy, there remains a counterbalancing, compelling govern-
mental interest - the protection of the officer and of the commu-
nity. 1' When this interest is removed, as in the Dickerson context,
nothing is left to counterbalance the equally compelling individual
interest in personal privacy.313 Therefore, when the Terry balancing
test is applied to the plain feel search, it is clear that the strong
individual interest in privacy outweighs any residual interest in the
seizure of contraband. 14
The Terry Court redefined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
rejecting the per se requirement of probable cause dictated by the
Warrant Clause, and focusing on the reasonableness component of
that amendment. 5 The Court defined its new analysis as a balance
between the governmental interest which justifies the invasion into
the privacy of the citizen and the intrusiveness of the search it-
self. 1 6 Applying this test in Terry, the Court identified the govern-
mental interest as the protection of the officer and the commu-
nity. 1 Because the search is for a weapon, and is only legitimate
for that purpose, Terry allows a search on the basis of reasonable
suspicion - a lesser standard than probable cause.31 8 Appropri-
310. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("[T]he war-
rant requirement ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable.");
cf. Scott Lewis, Terry Tempered or Torpedoed? The New Law of Stop and Frisk, Wis. B. BULL.,
August 1988, at 7 (suggesting that changes in the law of stop and frisk have diluted its process).
311. See infra note 365-79 and accompanying text (explaining that use of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement to bootstrap each other will result in erroneous deprivations of liberty).
312. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
313. See infra notes 325-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Terry balancing test in the
plain feel context).
314. See infra notes 325-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Terry balancing test in the
plain feel context).
315. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing relevant portion of Terry).
316. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing relevant portion of Terry).
317. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing relevant portion of Terry).
318. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing relevant portion of Terry).
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ately, the corresponding search allowed by the lesser standard is
much more closely circumscribed than an ordinary search. 19
Whereas a search pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause
may allow an extensive examination of an identified person or area,
a frisk pursuant to Terry is a narrow one that permits a reasonable
search for weapons only, and then only where the officer has reason
to believe that he is confronted with an armed and dangerous
individual.320
In fact, a plain feel seizure will result from virtually every Terry
stop and frisk in which a weapon is seized, as a Terry search is
actually based upon the sense of touch. 2' How else do the searching
officers know that the suspect has a gun or knife during a frisk, if
not through "feeling" it through his clothes?322 Indeed, the Court in
Dickerson recognized that "[t]he very premise of Terry . . .is that
officers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through the
sense of touch."323 This deference to the tactile sense is accepted in
the Terry context given the compelling justification of protecting the
officer and the community. 24
On the other hand, the Dickerson Court's endorsement of the
plain feel exception is grounded in the preservation and seizure of
evidence.325 This is clear because the plain view doctrine, upon
which the Court bases its acceptance of the plain feel exception,3 26
is founded on evidentiary concerns. 27 Although this justification is
less compelling than the governmental interest in Terry,3 82 Dicker-
319. See generally, LaFave, supra note 53, at 88-91 (discussing the permissible scope of a
Terry search).
320. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing relevant portion of Terry). In fact,
in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a search was invalidated as falling outside the scope
of the Terry formulation. Id. at 65-66. The search was improper because when the officer thrust
his hand into the defendant's pocket, he was looking for narcotics, not weapons. Id. at 65; see also
supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing Sibron at length).
321. See Lantz, supra note 21, at 574 n.348 (stating that Terry itself stands for a limited plain
feel exception for the purpose of finding weapons only).
322. Cf. id. (stating that Terry itself stands for a limited plain feel exception for the purpose of
finding weapons only).
323. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993) (emphasis added).
324. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
325. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
326. Id.
327. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (discussing the applicability of
the plain view doctrine when an officer comes across incriminating evidence).
328. See David L. Haselkorn, The Case against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant Re-
quirement, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 683, 697 (1987) (pointing out that the Court has acknowledged
that concern over the destruction of evidence is a very weak ground on which to base an exception
to the warrant requirement and stating that "[t]he loss of some evidence is accepted as the cost of
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son clearly gives the police more latitude for this purpose. 29 While
the initial stop and frisk under Dickerson must be justified by a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, once
the actual search has commenced, it would be specious to assume
that the officer is searching only for weapons. 33 0 As long as the of-
ficer's actions comport with the Terry requirements, (i.e. as long as
the officer engages in a standard pat search) he now has free rein to
seize virtually anything he comes across, providing he can later
claim that it fell within the wide range of objects that might feel
like a weapon or like contraband. 33' Given the relative importance
of the stated justifications, 332 this result is incongruous.
The governmental interest in the seizure of contraband is even
less compelling in light of the fact that there are numerous alterna-
tives that an officer may pursue if he believes that a suspect pos-
sesses contraband. First of all, there already exist numerous excep-
tions to the warrant requirement that an officer may legitimately
operate within. For example, if the suspect is in an automobile,333 or
there is probable cause to arrest the suspect, 334 or there are exigent
circumstances, 3 5 or the suspect consents to a search, 3 6 the above
considerations will be moot, as any search will already be outside
the warrant requirement. Even if the situation does not fall within
maintaining the sanctity of the fourth amendment"); cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (referring to the
governmental interest in investigating crime, and the more immediate interest of the police officer
in ascertaining that a suspect is not armed and dangerous).
329. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
330. See State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. 1983) (stating that "a 'plain touch' exception
would invite the use of weapons searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches, and thus severely
erode the protection of the Fourth Amendment") (internal quotations omitted); People v. Diaz,
612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. 1993) (stating that "[t]he proposed 'plain touch' exception could thus
invite a blurring of the limits to Terry searches and the sanctioning of warrantless searches on
information obtained from an initial intrusion which, itself, amounts to an unauthorized warrant-
less search").
331. See infra note 356 and accompanying text (cataloguing the various objects which might
feel like contraband); see also Haselkorn, supra note 328, at 700 ("[U]ndoubtedly police would
occasionally be able to convince a court, after the fact, that their touch provided them with the
requisite probable cause - for at that point the seized evidence will be before the judge."); Lead-
ing Cases, Constitutional Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 144, 173 (1993) (arguing that the plain feel
doctrine invites abuse because it tempts officers to conduct searches beyond the limits of a Terry
weapons search and then to testify otherwise in court).
332. See supra note 328 and accompanying text (discussing the relative importance of the pres-
ervation of evidence and the protection of the officer and the community).
333. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 148 (1925).
334. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
335. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
336. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
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one of the accepted exceptions to the Warrant Clause, an officer has
additional options.
A police officer also has less intrusive alternatives at his disposal
that may produce the same results from a law enforcement perspec-
tive in a given situation. 3a For example, an officer may use a dog to
perform a canine sniff, which could then give rise to probable cause
to arrest. 8  A canine sniff has been deemed by the Court not to be a
seagch, and is therefore wholly outside of Fourth Amendment analy-
sis.839 Additionally, an officer has the option of obtaining a tele-
phone or radio warrant.340 The procedure for obtaining such a war-
rant entails the officer contacting the issuing magistrate by
telephone or radio.341 The officer must complete a duplicate warrant
and read it, under oath, to the magistrate. 42 If the magistrate
deems that probable cause exists, he may proceed to issue the
warrant." 3
Applying the Terry reasonableness formulation to the plain feel
exception condoned in Dickerson, it becomes apparent that an indi-
vidual's constitutionally protected privacy interest is not outweighed
by the governmental interest in the seizure of contraband.344 While
such a personal invasion is arguably acceptable when the safety of
the officer and the community are involved, the balance tips the
other way when the justification is simply the seizure of contra-
band. 4 5 The basic premise upon which the Fourth Amendment is
founded is that any intrusion in the way of a search or a seizure is
an evil. 846 Therefore, those searches deemed necessary should be as
337. The Court has historically preferred less intrusive methods of searching. See United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (invalidating search of footlocker without warrant when of-
ficers could have impounded the footlocker and then obtained a warrant).
338. See, e.g., Lantz, supra note 21, at 584 (suggesting canine sniff as an alternative to plain
feel).
339. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
340. See Bradley, supra note 145, at 1471 (suggesting the use of telephone warrants to make it
less difficult to obtain search warrants); Lantz, supra note 21, at 586-87 (suggesting such war-
rants as alternatives to the plain feel search).
341. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See supra note 328 and accompanying text (explaining that concern over the destruction
of evidence is a poor basis for a warrant clause exception). Moreover, the Court in Terry states
that the police officer's interest in verifying that the suspect is unarmed is "more immediate" than
the government's interest in effective crime prevention. Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
345. See supra note 328 and accompanying text (explaining that concern over the destruction
of evidence is a poor basis for a warrant clause exception).
346. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1970). See also Chimel v. California,
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limited as possible.847
Dickerson's approval of the plain feel search runs counter to these
notions by condoning a broad search with a weak governmental jus-
tification. 8 8 Indeed, the "general, exploratory rummaging," which
the plain feel exception has the practical effect of bringing about,
seems closely akin to the "general warrant" abhorred by the foun-
ders of the Constitution.34 9 As personal privacy and freedom from
unreasonable searches were clearly paramount to the founders in the
framing of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness formulation
in Terry should be applied with exacting scrutiny when attempts are
made to create new exceptions to the warrant requirement. "
Where, as here, there is no compelling governmental interest to out-
weigh the individual's interest in privacy, prudence should prevail,
and the exception should be disallowed.
B. The Sense of Touch is Inherently Incompatible with the
Plain View Doctrine
A plain feel extension of the plain view doctrine is also inappro-
priate because the tactile sense is incompatible with that doctrine.
This is so because of the inherent differences between the sense of
touch and the sense of sight, as well as because the sense of touch
cannot satisfy the immediately apparent prong of the plain view
test.351
1. The Questionable Reliability of Plain Feel as Compared to
Plain View
There is substantial authority for the premise that the sense of
touch, utilized in plain feel, is less reliable than the sense of sight,
395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969) (discussing the evils to which the framers of the Fourth Amendment
were responding); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (stating that the intent of the
Fourth Amendment was to protect against invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life"); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (stating that the right to
privacy is one of the unique values of our civilization).
347. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
348. See supra notes 328 and accompanying text (explaining that concern over the destruction
of evidence is a poor basis for a Warrant Clause exception).
349. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
350. Cf. Haselkorn, supra note 328, at 695 (stating that Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987), suggested that the Court would be cautious in authorizing any expansion of the plain view
doctrine).
351. See infra notes 351-64 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the tactile sense
as used in plain feel doctrine).
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utilized in plain view. 52 Touch simply does not provide immediate
information as does sight.353 Moreover, use of the sense of touch
requires speculation and is more susceptible to mistake and inaccu-
racy than the sense of sight. 54
When the tactile sense is considered in relation to the sense of
vision, it becomes obvious that the former simply lacks the requisite
preciseness to make consistent, accurate determinations as to the
identity of an object. 55 In Dickerson's brief to the Supreme Court,
352. People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96, 107 (Cal. 1983) (Rose, C.J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part); State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992) affid, 113 S. Ct. 2130
(1993); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623 n.17 (Pa. Super. 1991) appeal denied, 611
A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982); Haselkorn, supra note
328, at 695; Lantz, supra note 21, at 565; Lewis, supra note 310, at 63; cf Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993) ("Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less
reliable than the sense of sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify
seizures of unseencontraband."). Contra United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 955 (C.D. Cal.
1989) ("When objects have a distinctive and consistent feel and shape that an officer has been
trained to detect and has previous experience in detecting, then touching these objects provides the
officer with the same recognition his sight would have produced."). Additionally, the State's brief
to the Supreme Court in Dickerson cited a study in which 100 objects were placed before 20
individuals. On the average, the 20 participants were able to identify 94 of the 100 objects within
five seconds using their sense of touch. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17 n. 11, Minnesota v. Dickerson,
113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2109) (citing Roberta L. Klatzky et al., Identifying Objects by
Touch: An "Expert System," 37 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 299, 301 (1985)). This analysis
does not, however, take into account the fact that in the plain feel context, the officer has the
additional impediment of having to recognize the unknown object through a person's clothing,
often leather or denim.
353. See supra note 352 (citing extensive authority). The court in State v. Dickerson stated
that "the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight." 481
N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992).
354. See supra note 352 (citing extensive authority). The court in Marconi stated that "when
an individual feels an object through a pants pocket . . . the sense of touch is not so definitive...
[as to] preclude other options as to what that item might be." Marconi, 597 A.2d at 623 n.17.
355. A poem included in Dickerson's brief to the Supreme Court is instructive:
It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind ...
And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!
So oft in theologic wars,
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean,
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he pointed out that
Adoption of the State's position would mean that any number of containers
carried by most people will be subject to examination: Keycases, change
purses, makeup kits, wallets, matchbooks or boxes, film canisters, cigarette
packs and glasses cases. Huge varieties of items . . . will [also] be . . .
examined: aspirin or other pills, buttons, watch batteries, hard candy, chew-
ing gum, marbles, cigarette lighters, combs, lipstick, thimbles, a small wad
of paper, and even lint in one's pocket. 3"
This panoply illustrates not only the diminished reliability of the
sense of touch, but also opens the imagination to the consequences
of allowing the sense of touch so paramount a role in achieving law
enforcement objectives.
2. Plain Feel Will Never Satisfy the Immediately Apparent
Requirement
Dickerson requires that a plain feel search, in order to pass con-
stitutional muster, must comport with the plain view requirements
delineated in Arizona v. Hicks. 57 It is the position of this author
that given the limited capacity of the sense of touch,""8 a plain feel
search will almost inevitably be unable to accomplish this task.
Hicks requires that, in order for a plain view search to be consti-
tutional, not only must it be immediately apparent that the object in
question is contraband, but it must be immediately apparent so as to
rise to the level of probable cause. 59 Hicks clarified that a reasona-
ble suspicion in this connection is not a sufficient quantum of
proof.360 The Dickerson Court analogized to Hicks in holding that
And prate about an Elephant
Not one of them has seen!
Brief for Respondent at 31 n.19, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019)
(citing JOHN G. SAXE, THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT, reprinted in THE POETICAL WORKS
OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 1 11 (Cambridge, Riverside Press, 1882)).
356. Brief for Respondent at 44, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-
2019).
357. 480 U.S. 321 (1987); see also supra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing the
Dickerson Court's adoption of the Hicks formulation).
358. See supra notes 352-56 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent limitations of the
tactile sense).
359. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326. One of the courts that helped pioneer the plain feel doctrine went
so far as to describe the requisite quantum as a reasonable certainty. United States v. Williams,
822 F.2d 1174, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also State v. Vasquez, 815 P.2d 659, 664 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1991) (utilizing reasonable certainty standard), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 1178 (N.M.
1991).
360. Hicks. 480 U.S. at 326.
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the contraband in Dickerson was illegally seized, 61 stating that the
seizure of the equipment in Hicks could not be justified by the plain
view doctrine because in that case, "the incriminating character of
the stereo equipment was not immediately apparent ...probable
cause to believe that the equipment was stolen arose only as a result
of a further search. 3 6 2
Indeed, if the sense of sight was insufficient to give rise to proba-
ble cause in Hicks,36 and the police officer's sense of touch was
unable to give rise to probable cause in Dickerson,64 it is difficult to
imagine a case where the tactile sense could give rise to probable
cause. Therefore, to sanction such a search is not to find that the
contraband was immediately apparent, but to implicitly lower the
quantum of proof required to make such an additional search or
seizure to something less than probable cause. Such a result is
overtly inconsistent with Hicks.
C. A Plain Feel Exception Will Result in Erroneous
Deprivation of Liberty
Perhaps even more than other areas of constitutional jurispru-
dence, the Fourth Amendment is one that cries out for bright line
rules. 65 The uniqueness of jurisprudence under this amendment is
that the consequences of these decisions - the resulting law -
must be executed by police officers under frequently demanding cir-
cumstances. 6 While, for example, the First Amendment gives
guidance to individuals with respect to how to conform their con-
duct to stay within the protection of that amendment, the Fourth
Amendment ostensibly gives guidance to the police with respect to
361. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993).
362. Id.
363. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324. In Hicks, the Court held that there was no probable cause to
move and record the serial numbers of expensive stereo equipment in a "squalid" apartment when
police had legitimately entered the apartment to search for weapons. Id. at 323-24; see also supra
notes 116-26 and accompanying text (discussing Hicks at length).
364. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
365. See Bradley, supra note 145, at 1473 (stating that it is uniquely imperative in criminal
procedure that the police be informed of simple, straightforward principles by which to guide their
behavior); William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Ex-
clusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. JL. REF. 311,
344 (1991) (commenting that "the bright line rules carved out by the Court [in search and seizure
settings] have not attracted officers' attention").
366. See Bradley, supra note 145, at 1473 (stating that "unlike other areas of law, which can
be contemplated at leisure . . .Fourth Amendment law is supposed to instruct police how to act
in the heat of enforcement of the criminal laws").
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conforming their conduct to avoid infringing others' individual
rights. 61
Since the Court began employing its reasonableness analysis to
fashion exceptions to the Warrant Clause during the Warren Court
era, over twenty exceptions to the warrant or probable cause re-
quirement or both have been condoned.36 8 While independently each
of these justifications may be analytically appealing, to apply them
in a vacuum is to ignore the realities of modern police work. Realis-
tically, a search is made and challenged, and it is the job of the
prosecutor to use the above exceptions in a "grab bag" manner to
attempt to justify the search. 369 When exceptions are strung to-
gether, or new exceptions are derived by analogy, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to justify the "new exception" under the reasona-
bleness analysis without creating results that are inimical to the
Fourth Amendment itself.
3 70
For example, while the plain feel exception is derived by combin-
ing two concededly reasonable exceptions (stop and frisk and plain
view) and by analogizing therefrom,3 7 1 the actual end result - that
police may frisk based on the governmental justification of seizure
of evidence - runs counter to the reasonableness analysis in Terry
itself. 3 7  Further exacerbating this problem is the Court's willing-
367. See id. (stating that if the police are confused about the law and therefore perform illegal
searches, not only does the prosecution suffer the loss of evidence, but society suffers violations of
the civil rights of its citizens).
368. These include searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, border searches, searches
near the border, administrative searches, stop and frisk, plain view, exigent circumstances, search
of a person in custody, fire investigations, consent searches, inventory searches, and airport
searches. Id. at 1473-74 (footnotes omitted).
369. See Haselkorn, supra note 328, at 700 (suggesting that police, after the fact, would be
able to convince a court that their touch provided them with the requisite probable cause). One
commentator noted:
"[T]he detainee's expectation of privacy is in danger of being eroded by officers who
. . . make a stop on a hunch and then ex post facto hunt through the statute books to
justify their actions under the guise of objective reasonableness; or touch . . . an ob-
ject on the person . . . of a detainee and conclude that they have fulfilled the neces-
sary 'probable cause' criterion of the plain-view doctrine when, in fact, they are only
suspicious of - or curious as to - what the object may be."
Lewis, supra note 310, at 63.
370. See Haselkorn, supra note 328, at 698 (stating that exceptions to the warrant requirement
are often "laid one upon another," and that this practice has "substantial potential to disrupt the
carefully crafted limits the Court has attempted to define for those exceptions").
371. See supra note 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing the confluence of stop and frisk
and plain view to form the plain feel doctrine).
372. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Terry Court's adoption of
a reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment).
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ness to forego close scrutiny of the reasonableness of the end result
of its new exception and fall back instead on the assertion that ille-
gally seized evidence will be excluded at trial. 73
The Court in Dickerson seems comfortable conceding that even if
it is true that touch is less reliable than sight, such a proposition
only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of
unseen contraband. 74 Presumably, then, the evidence would be ex-
cluded.37 5 While this reasoning may establish that illegally seized
evidence will be excluded at trial, it does not address the initial in-
trusions that will take place under the new doctrine. In fact, the
Court seems to be accepting the fact that more initial intrusions will
take place, justifying it by the fact that the evidence will be ex-
cluded when appropriate. 7 6
This reasoning assumes that the exclusionary rule is a wholly sat-
isfactory remedy for a party whose rights are violated. In fact, this
rule does not make a defendant whose rights were violated whole.3 77
Once the police subject the defendant to an illegal plain feel search,
the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy has been vio-
lated. Additionally, the defendant may have been arrested and im-
prisoned, and may also have been compulsorily subjected to numer-
ous court proceedings. 7 8  There truly is no way to make the
defendant whole after such a significant deprivation of liberty; an
increase in initial intrusions based on the justification that the exclu-
sionary rule will "weed out" the improper ones is simply
unacceptable. 37 9
373. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993) (stating that the fact that
touch might be less reliable than sight only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify
seizures of unseen contraband). It follows from this proposition that if the officer is unable, after
the fact, to justify the seizure, the evidence will be excluded at trial.
374. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
375. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 145, at 1472-73 (explaining that evidentiary exclusion is the
common remedy for the illegal seizure of evidence).
376. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (discussing this proposition in Dickerson).
377. Bradley, supra note 145, at 1472-73. Professor Bradley states that confusion in the area of
Fourth Amendment law is particularly troublesome because the exclusionary remedy lacks the
ability to make the defendant whole. Id. To exemplify this, he points out that "nothing can 'un-
search' [the defendant's] house." Id. Moreover, the exclusionary rule does nothing at all for the
innocent victim of an illegal search. In this situation, there will be no evidence to exclude. Id. at
1473.
378. See id. (stating that if police receive insufficient guidance from the Court and therefore
perform illegal searches, not only will the prosecution suffer loss of evidence, but society will suffer
violations of the civil rights of its citizens).
379. Id.
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IV. IMPACT
This section assesses the impact of Dickerson in the lower courts
and look at the likely consequences of these new jurisprudential ap-
proaches. First, the subsequent treatment of the Dickerson plain feel
exception in the cases of State v. Buchanan"'0 and State v. Bever-
idge8 ' is examined, 382 followed by a methodology proposal for the
lower courts to follow in applying the plain feel doctrine.3 83
A. The Impact of Dickerson in the Lower Courts
As discussed previously, several recent decisions present contrast-
ing treatments of the Dickerson holding by the lower courts.3 84
While some decisions take clear notice of the Supreme Court's ad-
monition in Dickerson that the plain feel exception was to be defini-
tively circumscribed by the limitations of the Terry search (i.e. no
manipulation of putative contraband),385 other decisions distinguish
or otherwise circumvent this factor.38 6 Additionally, courts differ
greatly in the level to which they apply the "immediately apparent"
prong of the plain feel test as discussed in Dickerson.38 7
380. 504 N.W.2d 400 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see also supra notes 273-88 and accompanying
text (discussing case at length).
381. 436 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); see also supra notes 289-304 and accompanying
text (discussing case at length).
382. See infra notes 384-407 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Dicker-
son rule in Buchanan and Beveridge).
383. See infra notes 408-22 and accompanying text (proposing methodology).
384. See supra notes 271-304 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which lower courts
have applied Dickerson).
385. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993). For decisions heeding this admoni-
tion, see Howard v. State, 623 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating search as
outside bounds of Terry where the officer "took and rolled the object between [his] fingertips to
get a better feel"); In re S.D., 633 A.2d 172, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (invalidating search as
outside bounds of Terry where officer did not indicate at hearing that he believed that the object
he felt and seized was a weapon).
386. See State v. Branch, No. CX-93-135, 1993 WL 430391, at *1-*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct.
26, 1993) (upholding a search as within the bounds of Terry where the officer stated that he
removed the defendant's pager from his pocket because he was "checking to see if it was a weapon
or not"); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 171 (Ohio 1993) (upholding a search as within the
bounds of Terry where the officer testified that he discovered a "large bulk" that felt like a "rock
substance" while patting down the defendant because it was reasonable for him to believe that the
object could be a weapon), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1195 (1994).
387. See State v. Rahmon, No. 63913, 1993 WL 437614 at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1993)
(upholding a search where the incriminating nature of a pill vial was held to be immediately
apparent); State v. Crawford, No. 64607, 1993 WL 384506 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1993)
(upholding a search where the officer testified that, based on his experience, the incriminating
nature of the object he felt in the defendant's pocket was immediately apparent). But see State v.
Sanders, 435 S.E.2d 842, 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating search where officer did not
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Courts have already begun to develop a variety of methodologies
for application of the plain feel test.88 One may categorize these
into a close judicial scrutiny approach and a deferential approach.' "
When the lower courts employ the close scrutiny methodology, they
tend to strictly adhere to the plain view/feel test, looking particu-
larly closely at whether the illegal nature of the evidence was imme-
diately apparent and whether the officer exceeded the scope of the
Terry search. 9 This entails careful examination of the officer's ex-
perience and officer's testimony, the physical characteristics of the
object, its packaging, and the piece of clothing in which it was
contained.89'
Other courts have developed an approach which is very deferen-
tial to the judgment of the police officer. 92 These opinions generally
tend to be very conclusory, resting on the officers' testimony, and
occasionally a recitation of the number of years a particular officer
has been on the police force and how many drug cases he has han-
dled during that time. 9 ' State v. Buchanan3 94 and State v. Bever-
idge,9 illustrate these different approaches.
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin in State v. Buchanan,96 was
exceedingly deferential to the judgment of the officer, 97 as the
courts in that state consistently have been. 98 Little attention was
testify as to whether it was immediately apparent to him that the item he felt was contraband);
State v. Cloud, No. 63102, 1993 WL 425368 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1993) (invalidating a
search where the officer testified that he did not know what the object in the defendant's pocket
was until he retrieved it).
388. See supra notes 273-304 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holdings of
Buchanan and Beveridge at length).
389. See supra notes 273-304 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holdings of
Buchanan and Beveridge at length).
390. See supra notes 289-304 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Bever-
idge in detail).
391. See supra notes 289-304 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Bever-
idge in detail).
392. See supra notes 273-88 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Buchanan
in detail).
393. See supra notes 273-88 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Buchanan
in detail).
394. 504 N.W.2d 400 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
395. 436 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
396. 504 N.W.2d 400 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 273-88
(discussing case at length).
397. Buchanan, 504 N.W.2d at 404.
398. See, e.g., State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317-18 (Wis. 1992) (showing extreme deference
to the judgment of the officer who conducted the plain feel search), cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 3020
(1993).
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paid to the actual difficulty of "feeling" cocaine through a bag full
of rice.3 99 In the final analysis, the court relied almost exclusively on
the officer's testimony at trial that the incriminating character of
the bag was immediately apparent and the fact that the officer had
knowledge regarding the packaging of cocaine. 0
Conversely, the North Carolina court, in State v. Beveridge,"'0
looked much more closely at the totality of the circumstances. 0
The trial court made elaborate findings of fact, and the appellate
court listed the most salient findings in its decision. 0 Specifically,
the court looked at: (1) the reason for the initial stop; (2) the nature
of the object felt; (3) the location of the object on the defendant's
person; (4) what type of clothing the object was felt through; (5) the
experience of the officer in violations of the nature involved in the
instant case; (6) the officer's knowledge of the nature of the area in
which the defendant was stopped; (7) the personal appearance of
the defendant (e.g. intoxicated, belligerent, etc.); (8) the defendant's
actions during the encounter; and (9) the officer's actions during the
encounter.4 0 The court went on to closely scrutinize the stop, frisk
and seizure under the standards set forth in Terry and Dickerson.05
The court employed this scrutiny through use of the specific facts
elicited from the above inquiries at the trial level. 06 It is this type of
inquiry that must take place if the core values of the Fourth
Amendment are to be preserved in the wake of Dickerson.0
B. Living With Dickerson - A "Reasonable" Proposal
The Supreme Court decided Minnesota v. Dickerson °6 by a
unanimous vote of 9-0. Only one justice wrote separately to reach
the same result on different grounds.4 9 Clearly the plain feel excep-
399. Buchanan, 504 N.W.2d at 404.
400. Id.
401. 436 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 289-304
(discussing case at length).
402. Beveridge, 436 S.E.2d at 913-14.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 914-16.
406. Id.
407. See Leading Cases, supra note 331, at 174 (stating that the Dickerson Court intended
that the lower courts skeptically scrutinize the testimony of officers who claim to recognize contra-
band through the sense of touch).
408. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
409. Id. at 2138. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, and stated that he would have
decided the case through a historical analysis. Id. at 2138-41.
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tion to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is the law of
the land, and many jurisdictions throughout the country presently
apply the doctrine.4 10 Despite the foregoing critique of Dickerson,
this author notes the wisdom of the Court in choosing a case with
which they could sanction the plain feel exception at the same time
as they sharply limited its application."1 With consistent applica-
tion of a methodology which employs some type of "close scru-
tiny,"41 the plain feel doctrine may be applied with the most mini-
mal risk of derogation of core Fourth Amendment values.41 3 The
following is a proposal for such a methodology.
The nine inquiries made in State v. Beveridge4"4 should be treated
as a guide to, but not an exhaustive list of, the inquiries necessary
for a trial judge or appellate court to pass on this issue. Because
plain feel searches are necessarily made in the absence of a search
warrant, the prosecution will usually have the burden to establish
the constitutionality of the search.4 15 This burden will be to estab-
lish constitutionality by a preponderance of the evidence.4 6 The re-
quired findings of fact delineated above should serve as a guide to
determine whether the government has discharged its burden of es-
tablishing constitutionality. At the motion to suppress, the prosecu-
410. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (listing jurisdictions and cases which have
applied the plain feel test).
411. See Leading Cases, supra note 331, at 174 (stating that the Supreme Court clearly chose
the Dickerson case in order to send a signal to lower courts to be extremely careful in determining
when an officer has established probable cause through the sense of touch).
412. See supra notes 401-07 and accompanying text (discussing the close judicial scrutiny ap-
proach used by the North Carolina courts).
413. See Leading Cases, supra note 331, at 174 (stating that "the Supreme Court [in Dicker-
son] minimized [the potential to expand the warrantless search] by sending an appropriate signal
to lower courts to be extremely careful, and perhaps even skeptical, in determining when an officer
is able to establish probable cause through tactile sensitivity").
414. 436 S.E.2d 912, 913-14 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); see supra note 404 and accompanying text
(listing the inquiries).
415. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 11.2, at 218 (stating that this is the rule followed by the
federal courts and the majority of jurisdictions and citing United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d
411 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Berick, 710 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1983); People v. Som-
merhalder, 508 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973); People v. Gouker, 665 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1983); Malcolm v.
United States, 332 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1975); State v. Slaughter, 315 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. 1984); John-
son v. State, 313 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 1974); State v. Fauria, 393 So. 2d 688 (La. 1981); State v.
Schneider, 470 A.2d 887 (N.H. 1983); State v. Morales, 176 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. 1970); Gordon
v. State, 426 P.2d 424 (Nev. 1967); State v. Brown, 333 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. 1975); State v.
Willcutt, 526 P.2d 607 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Morales v. State, 170 N.W.2d 684 (Wis. 1969)).
416. Id. at 236 (citing United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1985); State v. Rand,
430 A.2d 808 (Me. 1981); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983); State v. Moore, 272 S.E.2d
804 (W. Va. 1980)).
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tion will have the burden of producing detailed evidence417 with re-
gard to each of these inquiries and of persuading the trier of fact
that the plain feel search was constitutional.41 These findings of
fact should be clearly entered into the record, and both the trial and
appellate courts should make clear how these findings comprise the
factual basis for their findings of law and ultimate resolution of the
issue.
As a matter of law, a finding of fact that an object was not imme-
diately apparent should invalidate a search. 19 Moreover, a finding
that an officer continued to search after satisfying himself that the
suspect did not possess a weapon should also invalidate a search.420
Clearly, express findings on such issues will not usually be forthcom-
ing, and therefore, findings on the other inquiries above will be par-
ticularly relevant. The type of object and the clothing it is felt
through will be especially relevant, as will the officer's specific level
of experience with the type of crime, drug and drug packaging at
issue.2"  Through such an analysis as detailed above, it is the hope
of this author that the courts can consistently apply the plain feel
doctrine in such a way that does not further erode the Fourth
Amendment, while at the same time not unduly hindering the police
in fighting a concededly serious crime problem.422
CONCLUSION
Although the plain feel doctrine may seem on its face to be a
417. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 331, at 174 (stressing the importance of close scrutiny of
the officer's testimony).
418. See I LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 11.2, at 217 (stating that the prevailing practice is to
allocate the burdens of production and persuasion jointly to one party).
419. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993) (making clear that the incrimi-
nating nature of an object must be immediately apparent before its seizure will be valid); Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 136 (1990) (stating that the incriminating nature of an object must be
immediately apparent in order to justify its warrantless seizure); see also State v. Sanders, 435
S.E.2d 842, 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating search and remanding for additional findings
of fact where officer did not testify as to whether it was immediately apparent to him that the
item he felt was contraband).
420. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (invalidating
seizure where officer conducting a Terry-type frisk was searching not for a weapon, but for
narcotics).
421. See supra text accompanying note 298 (listing inquiries made by the court in State v.
Beveridge, 436 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)).
422. See Leading Cases, supra note 331, at 175 ("If lower courts heed the signals of the Su-
preme Court to follow the example of the Minnesota Supreme Court and apply the [plain feel]
doctrine strictly, then the plain feel doctrine will have a helpful, relatively minor impact on the
ability of police officers to enforce the law.").
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natural and foreseeable extension of existing Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence, its acceptance does more than simply extend current
doctrine. By altering the foundation on which the stop and frisk ex-
ception lies, the plain feel exception threatens to expand the defini-
tion of the warrantless seizure beyond that contemplated by the
Terry reasonableness formulation. Rigid application of the plain feel
exception, required by the Supreme Court in Dickerson, clearly will
protect the core values of the Fourth Amendment while at the same
time allowing the police the tools necessary to adequately enforce
the law.
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